Anahtar kelimeler: Ernest Sosa, Erdem Epistemolojisi, Gettier sorunu, Bilgi Abstract Virtue Epistemology is a concept that was verbalized by Ernest Sosa in 1980 - after the principal 3- page long article written by E. This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that the intentional object of a love of knowledge stands in something like a means-end relation to the immediate intentional objects of other virtues. The book is a must-read for anyone interested in virtue epistemology and it is sure to enjoy this status for many years to come. Indeed, the authors appear to neglect a compelling and venerable motivation for this approach, treating it instead as a kind of aberration of late 20th century epistemology. While mainstream analytic epistemology is their starting point, and while its concepts and key players loom in the background throughout the book, they are interested in understanding the intellectual virtues and their role in the intellectual life considered in their own right -- independent of whatever bearing reflection on these traits may or may not have on more traditional epistemological pursuits.
Out of the ferment of recent debates about the intellectual virtues, Roberts and Wood have developed an approach they call 'regulative epistemology'. The authors' own work is a good illustration of this point: their commitment to Christian theism shapes and informs their views about intellectual virtue throughout the book see, e. And like the latter, it has some pretty unpalatable consequences. But a stronger and more controversial interpretation of the relativity thesis is possible. Virtue epistemologists seek to ground the epistemic norms used to evaluate human cognition in a general commitment to aretaic or virtue theoretic , rather than deontological or consequentialist, forms of normativity.
Jay Wood With the appearance of online sites offering you all types of media files, including movies, music, and books, it has become significantly easier to get hold of everything you may need. But again, on this model, a love of knowledge is part of any intellectual virtue; it is not a virtue in its own right. My first point concerns one of the ways the authors attempt to motivate their preferred approach to epistemology. The authors' albeit limited sympathy for this view is evident in their treatment of practical wisdom. With these distinctions on the table, we can see that the virtue reliabilist project is in some ways more fundamental than the responsibilist project, since the latter importantly depends on the former. Ernest Sosa, 1980'de kaleme aldığı Sal ve Piramit ile ahlak felsefesinin kavramlarından biri olan erdemin, bilgideki gerekçelendirme koşuluyla ilgili tartışmalara uygulanmasının önünü açmıştır. The chapters contain many subtle insights, illuminating reflections, and rich illustrations.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. But given this systematic and fundamental supporting relation between a love of knowledge and other intellectual virtues, why not think of the former an element of any intellectual virtue, rather than as a separate or discrete virtue? If we are able to secure you a copy of the title, our supplier will send it to our Sydney warehouse. If we are informed by our supplier that the title is no longer available during this time, we will cancel and refund you for this item. The authors' position here, as well as its implications for an account of the structure of an intellectual virtue, strikes me as awkward and problematic. While we are unable to provide a delivery estimate, most backorders will be delivered within 8-14 weeks. Chapter 4 examines the nature of cognitive faculties e. In the course of their argument they analyse particular virtues of intellectual life - such as courage, generosity, and humility - in detail.
Roberts and Wood liken their approach to that of a cartographer: Maps are pictures that are typically meant as guides to something or other. Central to their vision is an account of intellectual goods that includes not just knowledge as properly grounded belief, but understanding and personal acquaintance, acquired and shared through the many social practices of actual intellectual life. Some highlights include: a discussion of the nature of understanding and its relation to propositional knowledge 42-50 ; an argument against a certain motivational requirement for intellectual virtue 71-80 ; and some very lively and engaging examples of how the intellectual virtues contribute to cognitive success see, e. . This approach to intellectual virtue infuses the discipline of epistemology with new life, and makes it interesting to people outside the circle of professional epistemologists. Review from previous edition Intellectual Virtues is a very rich, novel, and important contribution to the literature in character-based virtue epistemology; it is, in fact, the most important contribution in the last decade. As a result, these formulations are unlikely to function as a very good practical guide to the corresponding domain of cognitive excellence.
This is suggestive of a more standard two-tier analysis of the structure of an intellectual virtue endorsed by Zagzebski 1996 and others, according to which an intellectual virtue is in part a disposition to pursue certain immediate intellectual ends or goals for the sake of ends like truth, knowledge, or understanding. By accepting this constraint, Roberts and Wood could handle the sorts of cases just noted, since presumably the person who pursues the truth via her crystal ball does not have good reason to think that this will get her to the truth, and since the person motivated by a love of trivial or immoral knowledge presumably does not have good reason to think that such knowledge really is worth pursuing. In the space that remains, I will draw attention to three additional parts of the book, both with an eye to conveying more about its content and to offering some criticisms. Making several better distinctions among virtues will show us two important things. So-called virtue responsibilists conceive of intellectual virtues primarily as acquired character traits, such as intellectual conscientiousness and love of knowledge.
Oysa Gettier'in makalesinde sunduğu örnekler, bilginin gerekçelendirme koşulunun yeniden ele alınmasını zorunlu hale getirmektedir. This includes, but is not limited to, the concept of good epistemic reasons or evidence. In the midst of a small but growing literature in this focus on the agent, two clear trends are emerging that reflect a difference in interest by the authors rather than any real underlying antagonism between camps. Where faculty reliabilists like Sosa and Greco are concerned about sceptical challenges, virtue responsibilists like Zazebski or Roberts and Wood prefer to write about intellectual flourishing. Moreover, their abstract character is at least to some extent to be expected: they are, after all, formal analyses, aimed at capturing in a precise way the very essence of knowledge. Roberts and Wood have no such interest. Until the writing of the aforementioned article, knowledge was defined and regarded as justified true belief.
Ernest Sosa ile başlayan Erdem Epistemolojisi, Gettier sonrası ortaya çıkmış olan bilginin tanımlanması ve özellikle de gerekçelendirilmesi sorununa bir çözüm olabileceği inancıyla ortaya çıkmıştır. It focuses especially on the volitional and motivational elements of intellectual virtue. Intellectual Virtues is undoubtedly a very rich, novel, and important contribution to the literature in character-based virtue epistemology; it is, in fact, the most important contribution in the last decade. And how do they correspond? You can place a backorder for this title now and we will ship it to you when it becomes available. The central difference is that the former thinks of intellectual virtues as character traits like fair-mindedness and intellectual courage, while the latter conceives of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties like vision, memory, and introspection. Like Aristotle's treatment of moral virtues, the discussion in these chapters is engaging and intellectually satisfying. Ernest Sosa'ya göre, nasıl ahlaki erdemler etik alanında iyi şeylerin ortaya çıkmasına yardımcı oluyorlarsa, entelektüel erdemler de epistemoloji alanında var olan bir çok sorunun çözülmesine katkı sağlayabilirler.
It is not easy to pinpoint the complaint here; however, it seems to be that the pursuit of a formal definition of knowledge -- i. Ernest Sosa, erdem epistemolojisinin Gettier'in makalesinde belirttiği sorunlara çözüm olabileceğine inanmaktadır. To use one of the authors' examples, it suggests that religious faith might be an intellectual virtue for the theists but not for thoroughgoing naturalists. Virtue epistemology has been divided into two camps: reliabilists and responsibilists. They include: intellectual responsibility, , open-mindedness, , , , confidence in reason, love of truth, intellectual humility, imaginativeness, curiosity, fair-mindedness, and. How is this virtue distinct from other, closely related virtues? But these chapters do not aim at specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for the traits in question.
They also point to a the apparent intractability of the Gettier problem 9-20 and b the plurality of epistemic desiderata 35-42 as spelling trouble for the traditional project of defining knowledge. A distinctive epistemological method indeed! This approach to intellectual virtue infuses the discipline of epistemology with new life, and makes it interesting to people outside the circle of professional epistemologists. I think a more plausible motivation for their view is simply its own internal theoretical richness and fecundity. This is partly a return to classical and medieval traditions, partly in the spirit of Locke's and Descartes's concern for intellectual formation, partly an exploration of connections between epistemology and ethics, and partly an approach that has never been tried before. Nor are they driven primarily by any paradoxes or other logical problems that arise with attempts to understand these traits.